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Abstract 
 
This paper gauges, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the pertinent variables to corporate 
governance practices and their relationship to business productivity in the context of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This study was conducted in response to the limited literature in this 
context. A new code of corporate governance was issued by the Saudi Arabian Capital Market 
Authority as a direct consequence of the 2006 stock market crash; in 2010, the code was made 
mandatory for listed firms. Rigorous empirical studies are practical not only for Saudi Arabia 
and its policy makers but also potentially for solving global investment issues and ensuring 
security. This study found two variables to have a significant negative relation: chief executive 
officer turnover and independent board members. Thus, greater rates of chief executive officer 
turnover are associated with negative firm performance. In addition, independent board 
directors’ negative value was found to be very close to zero and significant only at the 10% level. 
Consequently, some caution is required when considering this result.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There appears to be a limited emphasis on the Saudi 
board of directors, its subcommittees, the legal 
system and their effects on firm performance (Falgi, 
2009). This paper intends to focus on this gap in the 
literature by analysing internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm characteristics and their 
impact on the Saudi stock market. 
Many regulations and market laws have yet to 
be implemented effectively (World Bank, 2009). 
Therefore, it is important to evaluate corporate 
governance mechanisms and their impact on Saudi 
firm performance, to enable policy makers to 
establish the consequences and effectiveness of 
corporate governance policies. 
The performance of listed firms in Saudi Arabia 
has been erratic and fluctuating. In 2010, 25% of 
listed firms were deemed to be negative performers 
based on their return on equity (ROE), 20% were 
deemed to be negative performers based on their 
return on assets (ROA). This poor performance has 
been attributed to various factors, such as the 
regressive implementation of company strategies as 
well as corporate governance (Peng et al., 2003; 
AlSaeed, 2006). 
Kim (2010) states that good corporate 
governance can boost investments and further 
develop the stock market, which benefits 
macroeconomic growth. Good corporate governance 
attracts and facilitates investments, as it sends a 
secure and safe message to investors with respect to 
the risks involved in investment (Heenetigala and 
Armstrong, 2011). 
There has been increased growth in the number 
of listed firms in Saudi Arabia due to the 
privatisation initiative led by the government. The 
number of listed firms distributed across various 
industries with different ownership structures and 
concentrations increased from 75 in 2000 to over 
170 in 2015. In addition, there has been further 
interest in foreign investment due to its stability and 
with the opening of the Saudi stock market to 
foreign investment in 2015. Indeed, Tadawul is the 
only exchange in Saudi Arabia in which stocks can 
be traded.  
It was only after 2005 that corporate 
governance concepts were deployed in Saudi Arabia, 
when the Capital Market Authority (CMA) began to 
pay closer attention to Saudi firm performance. 
Subsequently, the 2006 stock market crash 
necessitated a much-needed appraisal. There were 
increasing calls for the need of corporate 
governance and effective regulation and practices, 
particularly transparency, reporting and 
accountability (CMA, 2006). Since then, corporate 
governance received an increased emphasis and 
focus from academic interest to support from the 
Saudi government. Corporate governance is 
currently a fundamental focus in Saudi Arabian 
business environment. The CMA established the 
Corporate Governance Code in 2006, which acted as 
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a guideline. In 2010, it was made mandatory, which 
included the obligation for firms to explain any 
deviations from the Corporate Governance Code.  
The board of directors and the audit 
committees are primary internal defence lines that 
ensure good corporate governance practices and 
protection for firm shareholders and stakeholders. 
The board of directors are responsible for overall 
strategic running of the company, and the audit 
committee monitors and ensures the financial 
integrity of policies and activities.  
Al-Twaijry et al. (2002) found that the audit 
committees in Saudi Arabia include vague job 
descriptions and that their roles are often blurry. 
They were deemed to be set up in a regressive 
manner in terms of their inadequate independence, 
lack of expertise and limited implementation of 
objectives. Further reforms and stringent regulations 
were deemed crucial to rectify this and to improve 
the effectiveness and professionalism of the audit 
committee. Al-Moataz (2003) investigated Saudi 
audit committees by evaluating against best 
practices; the study reiterated similar concerns in 
terms of their responsibilities, lack of professional 
qualifications and independence. 
The current literature on Saudi corporate 
governance and its relation to firm performances is 
sparse, partly due to the lack of available data. This 
study aims to perform a comprehensive 
investigation into the corporate governance 
mechanisms used in Saudi Arabia. This will, in turn 
contribute towards the limited literature on the 
Saudi market. This study employs a wide range of 
key corporate governance mechanisms used widely 
in the established empirical literature, and the 
findings would be beneficial to Saudi policy makers 
and investors.  
Many existing literature have demonstrated 
that various features of corporate governance could 
potentially enhance the performance of firms 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985). This study aims to 
gauge the effectiveness and relationship of these 
corporate governance variables on Saudi listed firm 
performance. This study also expands on the limited 
literature, especially in the context of issuing new 
regulations, either from international bodies for 
banks, such as Basel, or local authorities, such as the 
CMA. This study expands on similar studies, like 
that of Bauer et al. (2009), by testing the variables 
related to corporate governance. The increased 
availability of data ensures potentially greater 
nuance in this field of study.  
Improved corporate governance is an emerging 
phenomenon in developing economies and has been 
interpreted negatively in certain contexts in terms of 
restrictions. This has been noted in different regions 
and business models (Al-Motairy, 2003). Corporate 
governance deployment in Saudi Arabia is still at a 
developing stage; hence, further evolution and 
modifications are anticipated and required.  
This study used various corporate governance 
mechanisms that are widely used and are of interest 
to investors in terms of analysis and evaluation. This 
is much more expedient than the utilisation of self-
constructed governance measures. This study 
utilised corporate governance variables that cover a 
wider range of categories that represent governance 
compared to other studies. For example, the 
Governance Index (G Index) used by Gompers et al. 
(2003) has been used in many studies; however, this 
index is based on shareholder rights and takeover 
protection only (Bauer et al., 2009). The main 
advantage of the G Index is its inclusion of many 
governance mechanisms and its effects in one index 
(Bohren and Odegaard 2003; Black et al., 2006). 
However, there appear to be no studies that 
investigate all the variables and mechanisms 
identified in this study.  
Thus, this study aims to be a comprehensive 
study that considers detailed variables with respect 
to corporate governance to help explain returns. 
Many studies have measured various organisational 
aspects on corporate governance enforcement and 
its impact on performance, including company size, 
structure, directors’ salaries and compensation, 
along with other variables that relate to corporate 
governance that could potentially enhance the 
performance of firms (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
reviews certain existing literature on corporate 
governance and firm performance and discusses the 
various corporate governance mechanisms employed 
in this paper to investigate market performance. 
Section 3 discusses the data and outlines the 
methodology of this study and Section 4 provides 
the analysis and evaluates the results; finally, 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
A plethora of studies have explored both corporate 
governance and firm performance (Berle and Means, 
1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Claessens et al., 2000; Berglof and 
Claessens, 2004; Dockery et al., 2012). Most of the 
corporate governance research originates from the 
pioneering thesis of Berle and Means (1932), in 
which the authors argued that the separation of 
ownership and the control of firms gives too much 
control and power to the managers of large 
corporations. This is made worse by diffused 
ownership structures. Owners were argued to have 
difficulty in controlling the managers employed to 
run day-to-day business. There is an inherent 
conflict of interest between owners and managers in 
this agency model, and it was viewed that managers 
did not have the same interests as shareholders. 
Rather than distributing profits back to 
shareholders, managers often prefer to re-invest 
profits or, in more extreme cases, pursue their own 
personal privileges and perks. Managers were viewed 
as a self-perpetuating oligarchy who were no longer 
accountable to the owners they were supposed to 
represent. Berle and Means argued that such an 
issue can be detrimental for firms and have negative 
economic and social effects. In their research, the 
focus on corporate governance as a specific strand 
of literature was born, and the separation of 
ownership and control is now commonly referred to 
as the agency theory.  
Most studies have focused on very specific 
corporate governance issues, such as ownership 
structure, board of director composition and chief 
executive officer (CEO) pay, and gauged any 
relationships of these factors with firm 
performance. Indexes have also been created to 
study multiple variables as an alternative 
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methodology, such as the G Index of Gompers et al. 
(2003); however, there appear to be some caveats. 
For example, the G Index is built on only one facet of 
corporate governance (i.e., takeover provisions) and 
measures the balance of power between 
shareholders and management (Bauer et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, in Saudi Arabia, takeovers do not occur 
as frequently as they do in developed economies; 
hence, this methodology may be considered 
inappropriate for application in the Saudi market.  
There are two main models of corporate 
governance: the market model and the control 
model (Lin et al., 2006). The market model is used in 
countries like the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (UK), where there are highly liquid markets 
with dispersed shareholders and where investors 
have no prior relation to listed firms (Coombes and 
Watson, 2001). In such markets, corporate 
governance emphasises the need for the board 
structure to be a separate objective body that acts 
independently of other firm management (Gregory 
and Simmelkjaer, 2002). The control model is more 
commonly used in places like Europe, Asia and Latin 
America, where there appears to be no clear 
separation of ownership and control rights, where 
shareholding is more concentrated and where 
owners hold seats on the board (La Porta et al., 2000; 
and Lin et al., 2006). Klapper and Love (2004) 
investigated 500 companies from 25 emerging 
markets and found corporate governance at a 
company level appears to be of paramount 
importance in emerging markets, which have poor 
investor protection. The study posits stronger 
institutional settings can act to substitute for 
company level corporate governance.  
Durnev and Kim (2005) studied legal 
framework on the corporate governance practices of 
859 companies from 27 countries and concluded 
that ownership structure, investment opportunities 
and the requirement for external finance all impact 
corporate governance quality. Companies with 
greater competence in governance were found to 
have greater value, measured using Tobin’s Q ratio. 
Some studies have gauged the theory of the linking 
effects of corporate governance and dividend 
policies with performance. The results provide 
significant evidence towards corporate governance 
effect on Tobin’s Q ratio and ROA (Bebczuk, 2005; 
Das et al., 2004). 
Further, some studies have examined the extent 
to which ownership structure affects firm 
performance. The importance of corporate 
governance can be highlighted in scenarios in which 
there are conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders or between large controlling 
shareholders and small shareholders. In these 
scenarios, managers or the large shareholders are 
only entitled to a small share of the company’s net 
revenue; however, they have full appropriation of 
resources (Bebczuk, 2005). Insiders of the firm are 
most likely to maximise their utility of both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits, even while 
the rest of the firm’s shareholders do not. Such 
benefits are the result of the amount of power and 
influence managers and large shareholders have in 
companies’ decision-making processes (La Porta et 
al., 2000; Claessens et al., 1999; 2001). These 
anomalies can be counterbalanced by implementing 
and enforcing good corporate governance in a 
setting with an effective legal and regulatory 
environment. These mechanisms discourage any 
harmful activity by insiders and, if committed, can 
be brought in front of regulatory bodies and legal 
action may be pursued. The separation of firm cash 
flows and control rights might negatively impact 
small shareholders and the valuation of a firm. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Johnson et al. (2000) 
and Morck et al. (1988) argued that incentive effects 
of concentrated ownership can have potential 
benefits for firm performance and value.  
Studies have consistently investigated the 
governance nexus (i.e., relationship between 
corporate governance and performance) directly or 
indirectly at an international level using cross-
country firms (Claessens et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 
2002) and country-specific data (Gompers et al., 
2003; Black et al., 2006). Most literature has 
displayed the beneficial effects of corporate 
governance on both firms and the economy as a 
whole.  
 
2.1. Board Size 
 
Certain literature has investigated whether board 
size facilitates greater company efficiency. 
Generally, it has been found that smaller boards are 
more effective than larger ones. Yermack (1996) 
found that a smaller sized board is more effective in 
the US; this is corroborated by the results of other 
studies (Ahmed et al., 2006). Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
studied board size in small- and mid-sized 
companies and found smaller boards to be more 
effective. Further, Huther (1997) and De Andres et al. 
(2005) found larger board sizes to have a negative 
effect on firm performance. Mustafa (2006) and 
Chan and Li (2008) also found poor performance in 
firms with larger boards, as larger boards can suffer 
from poor coordination, communication and 
flexibility. Moreover, larger firms can become 
ineffective, lose their aims and become dominated 
by board CEOs (Jensen, 1993). In addition, Jensen 
(1993) suggested that small board sizes are 
associated with better monitoring function. 
Similarly, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) claimed board 
functions become less effective when boards become 
larger in size, and they recommended an ideal board 
size of 8–9 members. They also argued that any 
potential benefits from more board members would 
be offset from slower decision-making processes. In 
contrast, other studies (Bhagat and Black, 2002; 
Beiner et al., 2004; Limpaphayom and Connelly, 
2006) failed to find any significant relationship 
between the size of the board of directors and 
performance of firms. A recent study of the 
Malaysian stock market by Zabri et al. (2016) found 
ROA to have a weak negative relation with board 
size, but when measured using ROE there were no 
significant relationship. Fernandez (2015) 
investigated the relationship between board size and 
the performance of firms from 7 European markets. 
The author based the hypothesis on the literature 
review and theory and hypothesised firm size to 
have a positive relation to board size. Furthermore, 
after an optimal board size it was hypothesised to 
affect firm performance negatively. The study found 
no significant evidence to support the hypotheses. 
Therefore, hypothesis H1 in this paper is as follows. 
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H1: Board size has a positive relation with firm 
performance (Saudi board size relative to other 
markets, are small with an average of 8 members on 
the board of directors)6.  
 
2.2. Non-Executive and Independent Board 
Directors 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that boards with 
a higher number of external or non-executive 
directors may be able to mitigate agency issues by 
enabling boards to be more independent in 
scrutinising and controlling firm management 
behaviour. However, there are mixed findings from 
studies that have investigated the relation between 
board composition (i.e., the proportion of non-
executive and/or independent directors) and firm 
performance. Rhoades et al. (2000), Dehaene et al. 
(2001), Othman (2003) and Lefort and Urzúa (2008) 
found that non-executive directors have a positive 
effect on performance of firms. Kamardin (2009) 
displayed a significant relation between non-
executive directors and firm performance, as 
measured by the ROA. However, Coles et al. (2001) 
demonstrated external directors to have a negative 
effect on the performance of firms. Similarly, 
Erickson et al. (2005) showed negative relationship 
between increased board independence and the 
value of firms. Guo and Kumara (2012) investigated 
the Sri Lankan stock market and found a small 
negative relationship of non-executive directors with 
firm value. Some studies (Bhagat and Black, 2002; De 
Andres et al., 2005) resulted in no significant 
relation between the composition of boards and firm 
value. Bhagat and Bolton (2013) found mixed results 
over different time periods in their sample between 
1998 – 2007 of the relation between board 
independence and operating performance. Pre-2002 
displayed a significant negative relation and post 
2002 displayed a significant positive relation. 
Rahman et al., (2015) proposes a similar pre- and 
post- Malaysian code of corporate governance study 
of the relation between board independence and 
firm performance. They hypothesised a positive 
association of the proportion of non-executive 
directors; although they did not carry put an 
empirical investigation to test their hypotheses.  Liu 
et al., (2014) studied independent board directors in 
China and found it to have a positive impact on the 
operating performance of firms. Knyazeva et al., 
(2013) also found a positive relation between board 
independence and operating performance as well as 
firm value. 
This study benefits from existing data on both 
non-executive directors and independent directors 
(also known as outside directors) in Saudi Arabia. 
However, the difference between the two in the 
Saudi market can be subtle, as both are meant to be 
impartial and work for the benefit of all 
stakeholders. Independent board members are no 
longer considered independent if they hold more 
than 5% of the issued shares of the firm, are 
representatives of another person who holds 5% or 
more of total shares, are related to any other people 
on the board or other executives, have held their 
position in the firm or any of the firm’s entities in 
the last 2 years, are board members of another 
                                                          
6 See descriptive statistics of this paper 
company or have held a position in any affiliated 
companies in the last 2 years. Non-executive 
directors do not have a full-time management role in 
firms and receive no salary7. The two hypotheses 
tested in this context are as follows. 
H2: Non-executive directors have a positive 
relation with firm performance. 
H3: The total number of independent directors 
has a positive relation with firm performance. 
 
2.3. CEO Duality 
 
The board of directors is generally led by chairman 
whose roles involve running meetings, overseeing 
the processes of recruiting and the dismissal of 
CEOs, and evaluating CEO compensation (Jensen, 
1993). The chairman should be independent to 
perform his or her leadership role objectively. The 
CEO may have self-interests; therefore, conflict in 
interests may arise (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1993). It is practical to have the chairman and CEO 
positions separate to reduce any dominating 
influence over the board of directors (Van Den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004) and achieve an appropriate 
balance of power to make management more 
accountable and to improve the independent 
decisions made by the board without management 
influence (OECD, 2004). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) posited there is a 
high likelihood of CEOs who also hold the chairman 
position to adopt strategies for personal gain, which 
could impinge on the maximisation of shareholder 
wealth and inevitably have a detrimental impact on 
the firm. Mallette (1992) also argued that this duality 
leads to greater instances of conflicts of interest, as 
the CEO sets the board meeting agendas and has 
powers to influence selection of board directors. The 
study concluded CEO duality hinders board ability to 
monitor executives effectively.  
However, there have also been mixed results on 
this issue of duality and CEOs. Shrivastav and Kalsie 
(2016), Peng et al., (2009), Coles et al. (2001), Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008), Feng et al. (2005) and Mustafa 
(2006) found a significantly negative relation 
between CEO duality and firm performance. 
However, Schmid and Zimmermann (2008) and Wan 
and Ong (2005) did not find any significant 
differences between firms with or without CEO 
duality. Moscu, on the other hand, (2015) found a 
positive relation between CEO duality and 
performance in Romanian firms.  In light of the 
above, hypothesis H4 is as follows. 
H4: CEO duality has a negative relation with 
firm performance.  
 
2.4. Audit Committee Size 
 
Audit committee size is viewed as a characteristic of 
the effectiveness of the audit committee as a 
corporate governance mechanism (Cadbury 
Committee, 1992). Corporate governance reports, 
such as the Corporate Governance Regulation (CMA, 
2006), propose a minimum of three members on an 
audit committee. Braiotta (2000) and Karamanou 
and Vafeas (2005) state that large audit committees 
have better organisational abilities and authority as 
                                                          
7 CMA Corporate Governance Regulations (2006):  
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/CORPORATE%20GOVERNANCE.pdf 
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well as a wide knowledge base. However, Karamanou 
and Vafeas (2005) argue that, if audit committees 
are too large, they can become ineffective. Processes 
and responsibilities may become lost, and, 
ultimately, committees may fail to quickly and 
accurately complete the tasks they are supposed to 
do. Aldamena et al. (2012) found smaller audit 
committees with greater experience relate positively 
to firm performance. Thus, hypothesis H5 is as 
follows. 
H5: Audit committee size has a positive relation 
with firm performance. 
 
2.5. Management Share Ownership 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) view management 
ownership of shares to be a good mechanism that 
aligns management interests to that of shareholders. 
However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Khan et al. 
(2011) show that high management ownership can 
help poorly performing managers hold their posts, 
thus lowering the effectiveness of governance and 
promoting the inefficient use of the market for 
corporate control.  
The effect of the ownership of shares by 
management on firm performance has displayed 
mixed results. A positive relation has been found in 
developed countries such as the US and Japan 
(Morck et al., 1988; Hiraki et al., 2003) and in certain 
developing countries like the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Malaysia (Claessens, 1997; Claessens et 
al., 1999; and Amran and Ahmad, 2013). However, a 
study of Korean firms by Baek et al. (2004) found 
that higher management ownership in terms of the 
concentration of shares led to greater equity losses 
during the 1997 financial crisis in Korea. This 
supports the study by Joh (2003), which also found a 
negative relation between management ownership 
and company performance in Korea. Bos et al., 
(2011) found mixed results according to 
concentration levels of management ownership of 
shares in the UK. Management ownership of less 
than 5% displayed a maximisation of firm wealth. 
Ownership levels between 5% and 15% displayed a 
negative relation to firm performance and ownership 
stakes above 15% displayed a positive effect on 
share value. 
This study uses two mechanisms to investigate 
the impact of management share ownership: the 
total number of shares owned by top executives and 
the total number of CEO shares. Thus, the following 
two hypotheses were tested. 
H6: The total number of shares owned by 
managers has a positive relation with firm 
performance.  
H7: The total number of CEO shares has a 
positive relation with firm performance. 
 
2.6. CEO Turnover 
 
CEO turnover is an important variable that describes 
the replacement of CEOs due to their poor 
performance. Many studies have found an inverse 
relation between firm performance and CEO 
turnover (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Conyon and 
Florou, 2002 and Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). 
Friedman and Singh (1989) argued that, 
although firm performance is a major factor that 
affects CEO turnover, other factors are important 
and cannot be overlooked, such as whether the 
existing CEO is closer to retirement age, whether 
CEO departure is voluntary and whether the 
replacement CEO was found beforehand.  
Volpin (2002) and Gibson (2003) argued that 
CEO turnover is higher in firms with good 
governance systems and found that the likelihood of 
CEO turnover increases with poor prior stock 
returns. This implies that the board of directors 
looks after the rights of shareholders (Weisbach 
1988; Furtado and Rozeff, 1987). On the other hand, 
Rachpradit et al. (2012) found no association 
between the probability of CEO turnover and firm 
performance. However, it has been argued that CEO 
turnover is crucial for the development of firms 
(Chang and Wong, 2004). Thus, hypothesis H8 is as 
follows. 
H8: CEO turnover in Saudi Arabia has a 
negative relation with firm performance. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
This paper focuses on corporate governance 
mechanisms in Saudi Arabian listed firms utilising 
the maximum available data at the time of download 
from January 2007 to December 2014. In total, 169 
listed firms from the Saudi stock market were used 
in this sample. The data was obtained from various 
sources, including Tadawul, Mubasher and the Saudi 
CMA. The study measured firm performance using 
stock returns.  
Al-Matari et al. (2012) suggested that certain 
corporate governance mechanisms could affect the 
performance of firms, such as CEO duality, board 
composition, board size and audit committee size. 
This study includes additional variables that have-
not been previously investigated, including 
management ownership of shares and CEO turnover. 
The aim of this paper is to study the relation 
between listed firm performance and corporate 
governance mechanisms measured through 
independent variables using regression models. This 
study adds additional corporate governance 
mechanisms to the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model to capture the relation between 
corporate governance and firm performance in the 
Saudi market. Different regression models were used 
to study the chosen governance variables. Since we 
used the monthly cross-sectional time-series data of 
169 companies (from January 2007 to December 
2014), we used longitudinal data regression (i.e., 
panel data) and employed random-effects 
generalised least squares (GLS) regression to 
estimate the regressions. 
Equation (1) shows Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model. 
 
             [       ]    [   ]    [   ]      (1) 
 
Where: 
   = the return on the portfolio or stock p at time t; 
   = the return on the risk-free asset at time t; 
  = the intercept of the model for the portfolio or 
stock p; 
  = the systematic risk of the portfolio or stock p; 
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   = the return of the market portfolio at time t; 
SMB = the small-minus-big estimates of the size of 
the stock; 
   = the measure’s exposure to the stock size; 
HML = the high-minus-low estimates of the book-to-
market ratio of stocks; and 
   = the measure’s exposure to stocks with a high 
book-to-market ratio. 
Equation (2) describes our model to investigate 
the effects of corporate governance (CG) 
mechanisms on Saudi listed stocks. 
 
 
             [       ]    [   ]    [   ]    [           ]               (2) 
 
Where: 
   ,    ,         , SMB,   , HML, and    are the same 
as in Equation (1); 
CG variable = the various corporate governance 
mechanisms; 
   = the measure’s exposure to the corporate 
governance variable on firm performance; and 
   = the error term at time t.  
The various corporate governance variable 
employed in this study are as follows:  
 Board size (i.e., the total number of directors 
on the board of directions); 
 Non-executive directors (i.e., the total number 
of non-executive directors on the board of directors); 
 Independent directors (i.e., the total number 
of independent directors on the board of directors) 
 CEO duality (i.e., when the chairman and CEO 
positions are held by the same person; the variable 
is equal to 1 if CEO duality exists and 0 otherwise); 
 Audit committee size (i.e., the total number of 
members on the audit committee); 
 Total number of shares owned (i.e., the total 
number of shares owned by directors); 
 CEO ownership of the firm’s shares (i.e., the 
number of shares owned by the CEO); 
 CEO turnover (i.e., the change in CEO; the 
variable is equal to 1 if the CEO changes and 0 
otherwise). 
To execute the methodology, the small-minus-
big (SMB) and high-minus-low (HML) estimates from 
Equations (1) and (2) were calculated. First, the firm 
size (i.e., the firm’s market equity) was calculated, 
which is the price multiplied by the number of 
shares. Then, the book-to-market equity (i.e., the 
ratio of a firm’s book value of common stock to its 
market value) was calculated. Both variables have 
been argued to have explanatory power in terms of 
market returns and consider the effects of certain 
variables, such as leverage and the price to earnings 
ratio on firms’ returns (Fama and French, 1993). 
The size variable (i.e., the SMB) and the book-to-
market equity variable (i.e., the HML) are mimicking 
portfolios that are obtained by creating six 
portfolios that copy the underlying risk factors 
associated with firm size and book-to-market equity. 
This was done by first calculating the median and 
splitting the Saudi stocks into two portfolios by size 
(as small [S] or big [B]). Then, the Saudi stocks were 
sorted into three book-to-market equity portfolios 
using the following breakpoints: 30% (low [L]), 40% 
(middle [M]) and 30% (high [H]). It has been argued 
that the book-to-market equity has more explanatory 
power for returns than the size of firms; thus, it was 
split into three groups instead of two. Then, six 
portfolios were constructed from the two size 
portfolios and the three book-to-market portfolios: 
S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M and B/H. The S/L portfolio 
includes small stocks that are also present in low 
book-to-market portfolios, and the B/M portfolio 
includes big stocks that are also present in middle 
book-to-market portfolios. The monthly value-
weighted returns from the six portfolios were 
calculated from month to month (Fama and French, 
1993). 
SMB considers the risks faced by firms due to 
their size. Small-stock portfolios (S/L, S/M and S/H) 
and big-stock portfolios (B/L, B/M and B/H) differ by 
size; therefore, SMB represents the difference 
between the returns of small- and big-stock 
portfolios with approximately the same weighted 
average book-to-market equity. This allows for 
differentiation of the effects of returns from small 
and big stocks and for the separation of the impact 
on returns from differences in the book-to-market 
equity. The book-to-market factor (i.e., HML) 
replicates the risk factors for returns related to the 
book-to-market equity. HML represents the 
difference between the two-high book-to-market 
portfolios (i.e., S/H and B/H) and the two-low book-
to-market portfolios (i.e., S/L and B/L) in terms of 
the simple average monthly return. HML represents 
the return of the high and low book-to-equity 
portfolios with about the same weighted average 
size. Therefore, the difference between the two 
returns should be free from the effects of size on 
the returns and focuses on the difference in returns 
between high and low book-to-market equity firms. 
 
3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for all the 
variables. The standard deviations of 8 of the 12 
variables are much larger than the mean. This 
indicates that the data is spread widely or that the 
mean does not represent the data. Calculating the 
median for each variable is a more appropriate 
measure since the median has similar values to the 
mean.  
Saudi boards have an average of 8 members, 
which is regarded as a small board globally, with a 
minimum of 4 and maximum of 13 members. The 
average number of non-executive directors is 4, 
which is half of the average board size. Non-
executives on the board range from a minimum of 0 
to a maximum of 11 members. Similarly, on average, 
there are 4 independent board directors, with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 11 members. The 
average audit committee size is 3 members, with a 
minimum of 1 and a maximum of 7 members. The 
standard deviation values for board size, non-
executive directors, independent directors and audit 
committee size are all much smaller than the means, 
suggesting that the data here is distributed closer to 
the mean values.  
In Saudi Arabia, only 8 of the 169 firms in this 
sample had CEO duality, with an average value of 
0.035. CEO turnover had an average value of 0.152. 
The total number of shares owned by managers and 
CEOs had mean values of 38,359,000 and 691,543, 
respectively. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Rp-Rf 0.363 -0.231 -66.021 396.171 13.800 
SMB -1.001 -1.773 -16.878 16.092 5.914 
HML -2.344 -1.947 -17.101 6.279 4.372 
Rm-Rf -0.186 1.281 -26.379 20.332 7.359 
Board Size 8.450 9 4 13 1.624 
Non-Executive Director  4.377 4 0 11 2.437 
Independent Board Directors 4.258 4 0 11 1.941 
CEO Duality 0.035 0 0 1 0.184 
Audit Committee Size 3.355 3 1 7 0.678 
Total Number of Shares Owned 38,359,000 2,161,490 0 6,039,000,000 318,011,000 
Number of CEO Shares 691,543 1,000 0 36,401,000 3,071,100 
CEO Turnover 0.152 0 0 1 0.359 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on all the variables and corporate governance mechanisms 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Correlation analysis 
 
Table 2 displays the 8 independent variables: board 
size, non-executive directors, independent board 
directors, CEO duality, audit committee size, total 
number of shares owned, CEO shares and CEO 
turnover. None of these variables had significant 
associations or correlations with the dependent 
variable Rp-Rf. However, significant positive and 
negative correlations existed between the 
independent variables (Table 2). For example, the 
independent variable representing CEOs number of 
shares was shown to have significant positive and 
negative associations with six of the other 
independent variables. Similarly, CEO duality was 
shown to have significant negative associations with 
three other independent variables.  
 
4.2. Regression Analysis 
 
Table 3 shows the Fama and French model, 
which explains the cross-section of returns in the 
Saudi stock market between January 2007 and 
December 2014, as displayed by the significance of 
the variables. Furthermore, most of the corporate 
governance variables included in the analysis have 
no significant impact, except for CEO turnover and 
independent board directors. R-Sq, the percentage of 
variability in the dependent variable determined by 
the independent variables, was found to be at 32–
34%, which is an expected result. Three other 
aspects of each model were analysed: the signs of 
the coefficients, the values of the correlations 
between all the variables and the significance of 
these correlations. If the sign is positive, the 
independent variable displays a positive relation 
with firm performance; if the sign is negative, then 
the relation is negative. 
Board size displayed a negative coefficient of -
0.029; however, it is not significant. The P-value of 
the corresponding coefficient equals 0.619, which is 
much greater than    .  ; thus, the null hypothesis 
(      ) was not rejected at the 5% level of 
significance. Therefore, Saudi board size has no 
significant impact on Saudi firm performance. In the 
study by Al-Matari et al. (2012), board size also 
displayed a negative relation as predicted, but it was 
also insignificant. Kamardin (2009) stated that this 
non-significant relation in the Saudi stock market 
could be caused by the overwhelming influence and 
power of CEOs. However, Fallatah and Dickins (2012) 
separately studied optimal board size and found a 
significant positive relation with firm value, 
measured through the Tobin’s Q ratio. Ghabayen 
(2012) found no significant relation between board 
size and firm performance using ROA as their 
performance measure. 
The number of non-executive directors, as a 
corporate governance mechanism, has a small 
negative coefficient of -0.050, but it is not 
significant. The corresponding P-value is 0.195, 
which is greater than    .  ; thus, we could not 
reject the null hypothesis (       ) at the 5% level 
of significance. The number of non-executive 
directors on the board has no significant relation 
with stock performance. Al-Matari et al. (2012) 
looked at board composition of non-executive 
directors and found a similar negative relation, 
although it was also not significant. 
Independent board directors also displayed a 
negative relation, but it is only significant at the 10% 
level. The corresponding P-value equals 0.089, which 
is less than 0.1, so we rejected the null hypothesis at 
the 10% level of significance. However, the result was 
in opposition to this study’s prediction in H3. It is 
worth highlighting that, although the correlation 
estimate has a negative value, it is still very close to 
zero and only significant at the 10% level. Therefore, 
some caution is required when drawing conclusions 
from this result. Fallatah and Dickins (2012) focused 
on board independence as part of an index and also 
found its negative relation to firm value; thus, the 
findings of this study are supported by that of 
Fallatah and Dickins (2012). 
Ghabayen (2012) investigated Saudi board 
composition as a ratio of independent to non-
independent directors’ and its effect on firm 
performance. The study displayed a negative and 
significant relation between board composition and 
firm performance. This negative relation implies that 
an increasing number of independent directors on 
the board have a negative impact on the 
performance of firms. While this result concurs with 
the results of this study, caution is required before 
concrete conclusions are drawn. This result can be 
benefitted by further extensions of study and even 
testing for causality. 
CEO duality has a positive coefficient of 0.638, 
however, it is not significant with a P-value of 0.240. 
Thus, these results do not allow for the rejection of 
the null hypothesis. Further, CEO duality has no 
significant impact on stock performance, even with a 
positive coefficient. Al-Matari et al. (2012) found a 
negative relation in terms of CEO duality, as they 
hypothesised. Although we found a positive relation, 
the results were not significant. 
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Table 2. Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 provides the correlation results for all the variables  
The standard errors are in parentheses, and asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively 
 
Table 3. Regression Results 
 
Corporate Governance Mechanism Alpha Rm-Rf (Beta 1) SMB (Beta 2) HML (Beta 3) CG Mechanism (Beta 4) R-Sq 
Three-Factor Model  
.779*** 
(.188) 
.921*** 
(.015) 
.545*** 
(.020) 
-.105*** 
(.025) 
- 0.32 
Board Size 
.943* 
(.504) 
.917*** 
(.014) 
.493*** 
(.019) 
-.082*** 
(.024) 
-.029 
(.058) 
0.34 
Non-Executive Directors 
.898*** 
(.204) 
.928*** 
(.014) 
.498*** 
(.019) 
-.087*** 
(.024) 
-.050 
(.038) 
0.34 
Independent Board of Directors 
1.069*** 
(.242) 
.924*** 
(.014) 
.503*** 
(.019) 
-.081*** 
(.024) 
-.083* 
(.049) 
0.34 
CEO Duality 
.669*** 
(.116) 
.919*** 
(.014) 
.494*** 
(.019) 
-.085*** 
(.024) 
.638 
(.543) 
0.34 
Audit Committee Size 
.888* 
(.472) 
.919*** 
(.014) 
.483*** 
(.019) 
-.079*** 
(.024) 
-.060 
(.137) 
0.34 
Total Number of Shares Owned 
.688*** 
(.121) 
.929*** 
(.015) 
.484*** 
(.020) 
-.095*** 
(.025) 
-0.000 
0.000 
0.33 
Number of CEO Shares 
.739*** 
(.122) 
.927*** 
(.015) 
.531*** 
(.020) 
-.096*** 
(.025) 
0.000 
0.000 
0.33 
CEO Turnover 
.766*** 
(.122) 
.923*** 
(.014) 
.476*** 
(.019) 
-.086*** 
(.024) 
-.678*** 
(.261) 
0.33 
Table 3 displays the results of Fama and French’s three-factor model of regression. It also displays the regression results for the fourth corporate governance variable, which is included in Fama and 
French’s original three-factor model, for 169 listed firms on the Saudi stock exchange between January 2007 and December 2014. The model is as follows: 
             [       ]    [   ]    [   ]    [           ]     , 
where,         is the excess return of stock p at time t over the one-month US T-bill rate.        is the excess market return of the Tadawul All Share Index (TASI) at time t;   and    are coefficients 
that estimate overperformance and systematic risk, respectively.   estimates stock exposure to the-small-minus-big (SMB) factor, and  estimates stock exposure to firms with a high book-to-market ratio 
(HML).   estimates the impact of the CG variable on stock performance, while     is the error term. The standard errors are in parentheses, and asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively
 
 
Rp-Rf SMB HML Rm-Rf Board Size 
Non-
Executive 
Directors 
Independent Board 
Directors 
CEO Duality 
Audit 
Committee 
Size 
Total 
Number of 
Shares 
Owned 
Number of 
CEO Shares 
CEO 
Turnover 
Rp-Rf 1            
SMB 
0.336*** 
(0.000) 
1           
HML 
-0.158*** 
(0.000) 
-0.441*** 
(0.000) 
1          
Rm-Rf 
0.516*** 
(0.000) 
0.215*** 
(0.000) 
-0.102*** 
(0.000) 
1         
Board Size 
0.001 
(0.916) 
0.002 
(0.822) 
0.001 
(0.905) 
0.009 
(0.318) 
1        
Non-Executive 
Directors 
-0.014 
(0.133) 
0.018** 
(0.048) 
-0.006 
(0.515) 
-0.017* 
(0.061) 
0.337*** 
(0.000) 
1       
Independent Board 
Directors 
-0.017* 
(0.065) 
0.011 
(0.218) 
-0.003 
(0.725) 
-0.016* 
(0.073) 
0.406*** 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.114) 
1      
CEO Duality 
0.006 
(0.493) 
-0.004 
(0.690) 
0.001 
(0.870) 
-0.001 
(0.894) 
-0.118*** 
(0.000) 
-0.058*** 
(0.000) 
-0.133*** 
(0.000) 
1     
Audit Committee Size 
0.002 
(0.855) 
-0.010 
(0.271) 
0.004 
(0.682) 
0.014 
(0.105) 
0.254*** 
(0.000) 
0.139*** 
(0.000) 
0.124*** 
(0.000) 
-0.034*** 
(0.000) 
1    
Total Number of 
Shares Owned 
0.006 
(0.558) 
0.008 
(0.390) 
-0.001 
(0.925) 
0.010 
(0.263) 
0.023** 
(0.012) 
-0.045*** 
(0.000) 
-0.034*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019** 
(0.042) 
-0.003 
(0.735) 
1   
Number of CEO 
Shares 
0.004 
(0.665) 
0.002 
(0.797) 
-0.005 
(0.599) 
-0.001 
(0.939) 
0.031*** 
(0.001) 
-0.035*** 
(0.000) 
-0.056*** 
(0.000) 
0.148*** 
(0.000) 
-0.042*** 
(0.000) 
0.087*** 
(0.000) 
1  
CEO Turnover 
-0.006 
(0.483) 
0.003 
(0.760) 
0.012 
(0.168) 
0.027*** 
(0.002) 
0.062*** 
(0.000) 
0.044*** 
(0.000) 
0.073*** 
(0.000) 
-0.054*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.161) 
-0.037*** 
(0.000) 
-0.062*** 
(0.000) 
1 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 14, Issue 2, Winter 2017, Continued - 2 
 
346 
The size of the audit committee has a very 
small negative coefficient of -0.060 and is not 
significant. The P-value equals 0.662, which is higher 
than 0.05. Therefore, we could not reject the null 
hypothesis and concluded that firms’ audit 
committee size has no significant relation with 
performance of firms. Al-Matari et al. (2012) found a 
significant negative effect of audit committee size 
on firm performance. This study found a very small 
negative correlation, but it was not significant. Since 
we used a larger data set and a longer time series, 
this could imply certain positive changes occurring 
in the structure of the Saudi market. Similarly, 
Ghabayen (2012) found a negative coefficient for 
audit committee size, although its relation to firm 
performance was not significant.  
The total number of shares owned by board 
members had no significant relation with stock 
performance, with a P-value of 0.863. Therefore, we 
could not reject the null hypothesis and concluded 
that the number of shares owned by management 
has no significant association with firm 
performance. The number of shares owned by CEOs 
also has no significant relation with stock 
performance, with a P-value of 0.611; thus, we could 
not reject the null hypothesis. Fallatah and Dickins 
(2012) displayed that insider ownership does not 
have any relation with firm performance and does 
not impact the relation between Saudi corporate 
governance and firm value; this is consistent with 
our results. However, Fallatah and Dickins (2012) 
studied individual corporate governance 
characteristics separately and found a negative 
effect of executive stock ownership on firm value. 
Furthermore, when the authors studied director 
stock ownership guidelines, they found that it has a 
significant positive impact on firm value.  
The variable of CEO turnover as a corporate 
governance mechanism was employed. It displayed a 
negative coefficient of -0.678 with a P-value of 0.009, 
which is less than 0.01 and is therefore significant at 
the 1% level; thus, we rejected the null hypothesis. 
This indicates greater CEO turnover is associated 
with negatively performing firms. This is intuitive, as 
a change in CEOs sends a negative signal to 
investors and stock market participants, which, in 
turn, is likely to influence negative stock returns of 
firms that may have already been underperforming. 
Although this study finds a significant relation of 
CEO turnover with firm performance, it does not 
shed light on the causality directions of the variables 
i.e. whether CEO turnover causes firm performance 
or firm performance causes CEO turnover. This 
study can be extended to further delve deeper and 
wider with additional econometric tests and models 
that can also be used for the other variables.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This comprehensive study analysed pertinent 
variables to deduce any relation with firm 
performance. The study was conducted in response 
to the rather limited academic literature on the 
implementation of corporate governance principles 
and its impact on Saudi firm performance. This area 
of study is an evolving one, and the future trajectory 
of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia remains 
uncertain. 
A statistical analysis was conducted using 
correlation and regression models to gauge the 
relationship between the chosen variables and firm 
performance. CEO turnover showed a negative 
correlation; greater CEO turnover is related with 
negative performance. Plausible reasons for this may 
be the resulting low confidence of the market and 
investors in the firm as well as the rather implicit 
suggestion that the company is not being led 
efficiently. The study also found that independent 
board directors had a negative impact on firm 
performance; however, this effect had a very small 
negative value close to zero that was only significant 
at the 10% level. Therefore, some caution is required 
when interpreting this result. 
Although not all available data show the other 
variables to have a significant relation with business 
performance, this could change in the future as 
Saudi Arabia expedites more corporate governance 
practices and as its economic paradigm and model 
begin to echo those of developed economies. 
Corporate governance is a relatively new 
phenomenon in the context of Saudi Arabia; hence, it 
is still evolving. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study, it 
would be interesting to investigate whether the 
current corporate governance model, which 
essentially emanates from the West, is suitable for 
use in developing countries, which have different 
political models, economic models and business 
cultures. Perhaps a more viable model that adheres 
to the epistemological and ontological frameworks 
used in Saudi businesses could be established.  
This study has found two corporate governance 
mechanisms to have a significant relation with firm 
performance. An extension of this study can be 
made by further econometric tests such as causality 
studies that shed light on the direction and causes 
which were outside of the main aims of this 
investigation. It is promising that as time passes, 
increased adherence to good corporate governance 
with more data being available with greater focus on 
the Saudi market will lead to many more studies.  
Despite certain limitations, this study provides 
a meaningful contribution to Saudi corporate 
governance regulators to assess the current relation 
and effectiveness of recent policies on the 
performance of the Saudi stock market. It will help 
forge future policy decisions and areas for focus as 
well as evaluate current practices. It can also help 
potentially solve global investment issues and 
ensure security. There are also benefits to investors 
in Saudi market in particular the large number of 
retail investors. It will also benefit foreign investors 
and institutions as this study sheds some light on 
the performance of the Saudi stock market and 
corporate governance mechanisms. Furthermore, 
company directors and managers can benefit too by 
evaluating their performance relative to the market 
with specific objectivity in relation to 
implementation of corporate governance 
mechanisms and its relation perceived by outside 
investors and shareholders. 
This study was conducted in response to the 
rather limited literature available in relation to the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Its minimum aim is to 
contribute to and help fill this gap by conducting a 
comprehensive study of the current corporate 
governance mechanism and determine the existence 
of any significant relation with stock market 
performance. 
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